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Abstract
The controversial state of Saudi Arabia lies at the forefront of American foreign policy debate.
This article examines how and why the United States supports a country that frequently abuses
human rights, and how power is involved in that decision. The most frequent reasons used are
that Saudi Arabia affords the United States economic hard power (i.e. the ability to coerce
others) as a trading partner, and that it acts as a strategic counterbalance to Iranian influence in
the Middle East. I find that while this is likely true, it also implicates the United States in almost
every violation of human rights by Saudi Arabia. This has made the United States look unwilling
or unable to live up to the ideals that make it attractive to others. In doing so, it has become less
preferable, especially in the Middle East, to “be American”. This points to a decrease in the
United States’ soft power, or its ability to persuade others into doing what it wants them to do.
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Introduction
On May 20, 2017, President Donald Trump and King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
signed an agreement for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to immediately purchase $110 billion
worth of arms, plus an additional $350 billion over the course of the next 10 years. Included in
this exchange were combat ships, tanks, missile defense systems, and radar (Michael, et al,
2020). This arms deal is certainly the largest thus far between the two countries, but it is not the
only one in recent history. The Obama administration similarly facilitated the transfer of $115
billion of arms sales to the Kingdom between 2009-2016 (2020). Meanwhile, however, Saudi
Arabia was committing (and continues to commit) a string of human rights abuses.
The strong economic and political relationship between the United States and Saudi
Arabia, in spite of the latter’s poor human rights record, highlights an important part of
American foreign policy debate. United States purports values of freedom, democracy, and
inalienable rights, making its nigh unconditional support of the Kingdom quite puzzling. This
begs the question: why does the United States tolerate human rights abuses from authoritarian
regimes like Saudi Arabia?
Statists and realists can offer a few perspectives to this question. Statists, while
acknowledging that individual states cannot claim complete sovereignty over domestic human
rights, posit that human rights ought not to be primarily dictated by an international system
(Donnelly & Whelan, 2020). To statists, there is no legitimate international society that reserves
the right to enforce laws and norms (2020). They argue that because the international enactment
of human rights norms is (or should be) peripheral to other pursuits, human rights abuses in other
states should not be a driving factor in American foreign policy (2020). Similarly, realists like
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George Kennan have argued that a state’s main interests are in “its military security, the integrity
of its political life and the well-being of its people” (Kennan, 1986). Following this line of
amoral policymaking, Saudi Arabia is enough of a strategic economic interest that the United
States does not need to worry itself with the domestic human rights affairs of Saudi Arabia, nor
does it need to worry about the impact the United States-Saudi Arabia alliance might have on its
reputation with other states (Donnelly & Whelan, 2020).
Liberal advocates of international human rights, especially those that ascribe to the
cosmopolitan model, see the issue differently. Liberal human rights advocates argue that the
world is not only host to an international system, but an international society. This global society,
comprised of individuals, states, and NGOS, ostensibly reserves the right (and perhaps an
obligation) to enforce international laws and norms pertaining to human rights (Donnelly &
Whelan, 2020). They argue that the guarantee of human rights is essential to peace and stability;
the primary focus (of cosmopolitanism especially) therefore is on individuals, not only states. As
such, they ultimately deem it a responsibility of the international society to intervene in cases of
human rights abuse (2020). They especially differ from the realist perspective here in that they
discourage the notion of amoral foreign policy decision-making (2020).
I argue that, through support for authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia, American soft
power has gradually eroded – especially in the Middle East. The intangible counterpart to GDP
and military strength (i.e. hard power), soft power is best described as “when one country gets
other countries to want what it wants” (Nye, 1990). A nation’s soft power largely derives from
the influence of its culture, ideology, and institutions (1990). The United States has been able to
exert a great deal of influence through its purported values; liberty, liberal democratic values,
and human rights promotion make the United States an especially attractive concept to foreign
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cultures (1990). Despite this, the United States has decided to turn a blind eye to blatant human
rights abuses by regimes like the Kingdom, which has made the United States lose some
credibility by association. Pursuing this amoral realist foreign policy in hopes of attaining more
power has, somewhat ironically, diminished it instead.
This article begins with a brief overview about hard and soft power. This involves
examining how human rights relate to American soft power and the limitations of trying to
measure power. Next, we briefly examine the history of the relationship between the United
States and Saudi Arabia. This segues into how relationships with authoritarian regimes like Saudi
Arabia have eroded American soft power, especially in the Middle East. This article closes with
implications and recommendations for the future of American soft power and its relationship
with Saudi Arabia.

Part I: Difficulties of Measuring Power
Hard power is power that is derived from materials, and allows for states to coerce, bully,
and/or force others into doing what they want (Walker). Military spending and economic
strength are perhaps the most familiar forms of hard power. The United States has a larger
military budget than the next ten nations combined (SIPRI, 2020). It has the highest total GDP in
the world (Trading Economics, 2019). It stands at the forefront of numerous alliances and
international organizations, and it supplements all of this with its considerable nuclear arsenal.
Simply put, it is quite successful in this regard. There is no dispute that agreements like the 2017
arms deal with Saudi Arabia have greatly contributed to the expansion of hard power (Michael,
et al, 2020).
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As already mentioned, soft power differs from hard power in that it is considerably more
abstract. A nation’s soft power largely derives from the attraction of its culture, ideology, and
institutions (Nye, 1990). If hard power wins fights, then soft power wins hearts. In the American
context, much of its soft power is derived from the attractiveness of what it means to “be
American”. Liberty, opportunity, and human rights are all enticing ideals. As such, when nations
are properly seduced by American soft power, they will more or less choose to emulate
American interests by their own volition. When people in a given region grow to dislike the
concept of being American because, say, the United States contributed to local human rights
abuses, then they are less likely to do things that parallel American interests. This has been
described as a “kiss of death” (Nye, 2004).
Soft and hard power both refer to potentialities, and so it is necessary to understand the
importance of actually putting them into action. Successfully getting another state to do
something via power, also known as the actualization of power, is where one of the key
differences between hard and soft power shines (Walker). That difference is cost. Hard power
affords states a few different options to exact change: they can bribe other states, threaten them
with sanctions, threaten violence, and actually commit to brute force (Walker). Each one of those
options can be quite costly. Soft power, on the other hand, persuades the other state to make that
change themselves. It is because of this that soft power is almost always the least costly form of
power (Walker). A prime example of successful soft power actualization is the Marshall Plan.
Presented as a humanitarian document to restore war-torn Europe, this plan sent large sums of
money to the states in Western Europe. This pushed those states into rejecting communism,
accepting liberal democracy, and creating a powerful American ally in the EU (Ivanova, 2008).
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A limitation that must be considered when discussing this topic, however, is that it is
difficult to actually measure power. Hard power can arguably be determined by taking into
account total GDP and defense spending, but that does not necessarily give you a numerical
“power level”. Likewise, soft power cannot simply be “solved” through an arithmetic of “good”
actions and “bad” actions (Nye, 2010). The Soft Power 30 attempts to measures soft power
composite scores of individual countries with six different metrics: digital, culture, enterprise,
engagement, education, and government. The United States is virtually unrivaled in the digital,
education, and culture sections (The Soft Power 30, 2019). A section where American soft power
does not rank quite so high is in the “government” section. The Soft Power 30 (2019) uses this
metric to “assess a state’s political values, public institutions, and major public policy
outcomes”. Factors taken into consideration include government effectiveness, human
development, individual freedoms, and human rights (2019). As of 2019, the United States
ranked 21st in government soft power, dropping from 16th place in 2016 (2019). This drop
resulted in the United States having a record low cumulative ranking of 5th place (2019). These
rankings are believable, considering the United States is host to a myriad of powerful tech
companies, top tier universities, far-reaching cultural norms, and a rather controversial
government (2019). Something to note, however, is that the reports of diminished soft power
correlate with the election of former president Donald Trump (2019). The Trump administration
frequently espoused mercantilist policies under the slogan of “America First'', with the goal of
supposedly doing what was in America’s national interest. Steps taken included prioritizing
bilateral trade deals, such the arms deal with Saudi Arabia in 2017, over multilateral agreements
(2019). This drop in soft power rating obviously cannot be attributed solely to American
relations with authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia, nor can they even be solely attributed to
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foreign policy. Therein lies a problem with trying to assess changes in power. We cannot solely
rely on these rankings to pinpoint how Saudi Arabia has affected American soft power, and so
we must use predetermined indicators of soft power decline instead.

Part II: How Authoritarian Regimes like Saudi Arabia Have Undermined the United
States’ Soft Power
While the nebulousness of precisely measuring power has already been explained, that
does not mean this puzzle is unsolvable. Joseph Nye (2018) notes that a state’s soft power can
decline in three ways: when its culture is no longer attractive, when it does not live up to its
political values (democracy and human rights), and when its policies fail to lack legitimacy,
humility, and “awareness of others interests” (Nye, 2018). Iraq is a good example of this
formula. Iraq as a whole became “Anti-American” after the United States invaded the country
under faulty pretenses, inflicted severe collateral damage, and failed to establish any form of
democracy (2004). In order to see how authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia have likely
eroded American soft power, we must find examples of how its relationship with the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia have similarly facilitated any of the three aforementioned ways to reduce soft
power.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have always shared an odd relationship. Though the
two nations are allies, their systems of government are almost completely antithetical. The
United States purports to be a representative democracy that separates church and state and
guarantees its citizens basic human rights. Saudi Arabia is an autocratic, monarchical theocracy.
It is easy to assume, then, that this long-lasting partnership has not been out of mutual admiration
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for the other’s system of government. Supporting Israel and making an enemy of Iran (among
other transgressions) have left the United States with few allies in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia
seems to be one of few exceptions. Abundant oil certainly makes it a formidable trading partner,
and therefore a considerable source of hard power. Saudi demographics are perhaps just as
important, too. Being a Sunni majority, the United States-Saudi alliance is in the mutual interests
of both states that wish to counterbalance Shia Iran (Michael, et al, 2020). Simply put, the United
States-Saudi alliance is one of economic, political, and strategic convenience. This makes for a
formidable source of hard power, but unfortunately contradicts American political values of
democracy. Unfortunately, this convenience has allowed for American leaders to ignore some of
the blatant abuses of human rights within Saudi Arabia’s own borders.
Saudi officials have often and repeatedly repressed free speech both online and offline.
Activists, such as those voicing support for women’s rights, are arbitrarily arrested and held in
detention without charge or trial (Amnesty International, 2019). Capital punishment is issued in
court proceedings that do not abide by international standards of a fair trial; defendants are often
not afforded any form of legal assistance, and others have claimed that they were tortured into
confessions (2019). A disproportionate amount of the people sentenced to capital punishment are
of the Shi’ite minority (2019). Women are also treated as second-class citizens. It was not very
long ago that the law allowed for the arrest of a young woman for driving (Milanovic, 2020).
Additionally, while Saudi women no longer require a guardian to travel, they still need a
guardian’s approval to get married (Amnesty International, 2019). In this regard, the United
States has failed to honor the 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments of its own Constitution by
tolerating unfair trials, cruel and unusual punishment, and negligence of due process.
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While the Kingdom has certainly made a habit of violating the human rights of its
citizens, it is perhaps the death of one man that has incited the most worldwide criticism. A
Saudi Arabian Washington Post columnist, Jamal Khashoggi, was assassinated and dismembered
in 2018 while visiting the Saudi consulate in Istanbul (Milanovic, 2020). Saudi officials outright
denied reports of Khashoggi’s death, claiming that he had left the consulate. Riyadh maintained
this façade until overwhelming evidence (including an audio tape) forced it into acknowledging
that the journalist had, in fact, died (2020). While the Saudi administration still denies any
connection between the killing and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, American intelligence
agencies nonetheless agree that the murder of Khashoggi was premeditated and, more than
likely, ordered by the crown prince himself (2020). As a journalist, Khashoggi was obviously a
proponent of free speech and the press. He was outspoken about his belief in women’s rights,
and frequently criticized the Saudi regime; he notably voiced his support for Loujain al-Hathloul,
the young woman who was arrested for violating a law that barred women from driving (2020).
At this point, determining whether or not the crown prince is truly guilty is ultimately irrelevant.
What matters is that most of the world believes that he and his administration were involved in
the murder of a journalist. This has had a major impact on worldwide perception of the Saudi
Arabian regime. The cumulative damage to the Kingdom’s reputation has crudely been described
by a Saudi official as being “10 times worse than 9/11” (Usher, 2019). American officials have
denounced this event and condemned the Saudi regime, but little was done beyond that. This
muted response, broadcasted to the entire international system, ultimately shows a failure of the
United States to effectively protect one of its most fundamental (and perhaps most attractive)
values – freedom of speech.
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Unfortunately, Khashoggi is not the only casualty that the United States has elected to
ignore in favor of its strategic partner in the Arabian Peninsula. In 2014, Shia rebels in Yemen,
known as the Houthis, captured the capital city of Sana’a. The Houthis made a number of
demands, such as lower gas prices and the formation of a new government (Michael, et al, 2020).
When the Sunni leadership refused to meet this demand, the rebels captured the presidential
palace and deposed President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his administration in 2015.
President Hadi sought asylum in Saudi Arabia, which, along with the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Pakistan, and Egypt, began a military
offensive to stop the Houthi advance in Yemen (2020). The Saudis have been ruthless in their
assault. No target has been spared; warehouses, factories, water supplies, power plants, cultural
centers, and even hospitals were bombed (Cockburn, 2016). Thousands of civilians were killed
or wounded, and Saudi Arabia ensured there would be no reprieve by blockading the country
from all food, fuel, and medicine (2016). By 2017, humanitarian organizations had determined
that upwards of 17.8 million people in Yemen had insufficient food and water as a result of the
Saudi blockade (World Peace Foundation, 2017). Many of the weapons used by the Saudis
during the onset of this crisis were supplied the $115 billion arms deal with the Obama
administration (Michael, et al, 2020). The United States also saw the defeat of the Shia Houthis
as a way to further counteract Iranian influence, and so it even provided Saudi warplanes with
fuel (2020). Members of the Obama administration recognized that this as a risk to credibility
because it implicated the United States as being complicit to Saudi Arabian war crimes (2020).
Any chance of de-escalation was quashed when the Donald Trump took office and agreed to sell
Saudi Arabia even more weapons and technology in 2017 (2020). By doing this, the United
States willingly solidified itself as a co-beligerent in one of the worst humanitarian disasters in
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recent history (2020). The United States not only failed to live up to its value of protecting
human rights, it took part in ensuring their degradation in the Middle East.
Any drops in American soft power within recent years obviously cannot be solely
attributed to these specific events, nor specifically to the United States’ support for Saudi Arabia.
The important takeaway is that tolerance of blatant human rights abuses like these are part and
parcel to the amoral foreign policy approach of the past several years. As much economic and
military power an authoritarian regime like Saudi Arabia may offer, its tendency to abuse human
rights comes with the cost of making the United States more unattractive by association. It is safe
to assume that the United States’ tolerance of, and even its particpation in, human rights abuses
by authoritarian regimes has furthered the development of what has been referred to as “AntiAmericanism” in the Middle East (Nye, 2004). As the name might suggest, this is not conducive
to stability of American soft power.

Implications and Recommendations for the Future
This leaves us with the question of what lies ahead for the United States. The new Biden
administration already seems significantly less tolerant of the Saudi regime. Biden claimed in his
presidential campaign that, in light of Riyadh’s numerous human rights abuses, the United States
would be “reassessing” its relationship with Saudi Arabia (Guzansky & Shavit, 2020). Biden
made good on this statement in February of 2021, when he put the remainder of the 2017 arms
deal on indefinite hold (Emmons, 2021). At the very least, this puts an end to what could be
considered the United States’ active participation in the (still ongoing) Yemen crisis. American
leaders should keep in mind, however, that they will continue to be implicated in any future
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human rights abuses by their authoritarian allies that remain unchallenged. This is where the
inherent volatility of the United States becomes problematic. Even if the current administration
makes the necessary changes to reverse any residual damage to American soft power, a future
statist or realist administration in four or eight years could very easily throw away any progress
in his or her own foreign policy pursuits.
Moving forward, the United States will have to evaluate what it wishes to accomplish in
the Middle East. It could very easily continue to look the other way as the blatant human rights
violations of Saudi Arabia continue to damage its reputation in the Middle East and abroad. The
enormous economic and strategic benefits that the oil state offers are understandably quite
tempting. However, I believe there is a much preferable alternative. Guzansky and Shavit note
that, with the new administration, Saudi Arabia will have to work harder to prove its continued
usefulness to the United States (2020). While the Biden administration would be remiss to cut
ties with Saudi Arabia, this does provide an opportunity to make change. The Kingdom is a
reliable source of hard power, but there is no reason that has to always be at the cost of soft
power. The United States is certainly not limited in its options here. It can persuade, bribe, or
even threaten Saudi Arabia into taking human rights more seriously. After all, what good is the
United States’ power if it cannot be actualized?
Conclusion
United States support for authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia has eroded its soft
power, especially in the Middle East. The alliance between the democratic United States and the
authoritarian Saudi Arabia is puzzling, but those ascribing to statist and realist beliefs have
justified it as a way to secure hard power. This has made the United States complicit, and at
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times even a co-beligerent, in Saudi Arabian human rights violations. While it is considerably
difficult to actually measure changes in power, the United States has tolerated Saudi Arabian’s
antithetical system of government, its repression of women and minorities, and the murder of
Jamal Khashoggi. Furthermore, it continued to sell arms to the Saudis despite their involvement
in the Yemen crisis. These are all cases in which the United States has failed to live up to its
ostensible political values of democracy and human rights, making it less attractive. Naturally,
being less attractive makes it more difficult to persuade others, suggesting the United States soft
power has been damaged. As such, in pursuing amoral realist policy with authoritarian regimes
like Saudi Arabia, the United States has ironically whittled away an important concept of realism
– power (Donnelly & Whelan, 2020).
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